Syllabus

Schedule

• Lecture 0: Course Introduction - Outline; History; Games

• Lecture 1: Static Games of Complete Information - Representation; Normal-Form Games; Dominance

• Lecture 2: Static Games of Complete Information - Best Response; Rationalizability; Nash Equilibrium; Mixed Strategies

• Lecture 3: Static Games of Complete Information - Applications - Cournot and Bertrand Duopoly, Hotelling-Downs Competition, Routing Games

• Lecture 4: Dynamic Games of Complete Information - Extensive-Form Games; Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium

• Lecture 5: Dynamic Games of Complete Information - Applications - Stackelberg Duopoly, Cournot Duopoly with Advertising, Sequential Bargaining

• Lecture 5.5: Game Theory in the Lab - Reality Check of the Nash Equilibrium Concept

• Lecture 6: Static Games of Incomplete Information - Bayesian Games; Bayes Nash Equilibrium

• Lecture 7: Static Games of Incomplete Information - Applications - Public Goods, Swing Voter’s Curse, Auctions

• Lecture 8: Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information - Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; Signaling Game

• Lecture 9: Repeated Games - Prisoner’s Dilemma; Folk Theorem; Cournot Collusion

• Lecture 10.1: Nash Bargaining Solution

• Lecture 10.2: Cooperative Game Theory - The Core; Shapley Value

Problem Sets

• Problem Set 1

• Problem Set 2

• Problem Set 3

• Problem Set 4

• Extra Problems

Materials based on Game Theory for Applied Economists by Robert Gibbons, among other resources.